Introduction
Article VII of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) supports the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs) as a regional component of the nonproliferation regime. 2 In 1975, the UN General Assembly defined a NWFZ as 'any zone, recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of States in the free exercise of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby: (a) the statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined; (b) an international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute'. 3 According to the General Assembly, then, a NWFZ has two essential components: the total absence of nuclear weapons within the zone and the presence of an international verification and control machinery. 1 PhD in international law, University of Rome 'La Sapienza'; Reader in International Law, University of Westminster. This article is based on developments as of June 2013 and all websites were also last visited on that date. 2 Art. VII reads as follows: 'Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories'. 3 General Assembly Resolution 3472 (XXX) B of 11 December 1975. 4 In 1976, a group of experts appointed by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament presented a comprehensive study setting out the principles that should be taken into account in order to establish a NWFZ. According to the study, 1) disarmament obligations may be assumed not only by large groups of states, but also by smaller groups and even by individual countries; 2) the agreement must ensure the absence of nuclear weapons in the region; 3) the initiative for the creation of the NWFZ should come from the regional states and participation must be voluntary; 4) all regional states (and in particular those militarily significant) should ideally participate in the initiative; 5) an effective system of verification of compliance must be set up in the agreement; 6) cooperation on all peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be promoted; 7) and the treaty should be of unlimited duration ( ) . It is to be noted that the 1999 guidelines, like those of 1976, are meant to guide states in establishing NWFZs but cannot be regarded as binding or exhaustive, or be interpreted in a way as to prejudice the establishment of a NWFZ. 5 The text of the treaties can be read on the website of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL): <www.opanal.org/NWFZ/nwfz.htm>. 6 Law of Mongolia on its nuclear-weapon-free status, adopted on 3 February 2000 (text at <www.opanal.org/NWFZ/Mongolia/mongolia_en.htm>). 7 Art. I. 8 General Assembly Resolution A/RES/3263 (XXIX), 9 December 1974. The resolution has been adopted every year since then. See P.M. Lewis, 'A Middle East Free of Nuclear Weapons: Possible, Probable or Pipe-Dream?', 89 International Affairs (2013), 435-436. 9 The first resolution to be adopted by the General Assembly on the issue is Resolution 3263 of 9 December 1974. Resolution 46/30 of 6 December 1991 is the first to extend the initiative to all WMDs. The most recent resolution is so far Resolution 67/28 of 11 December 2012. The Arab League has also supported the initiative and called for the drafting of a treaty. conference has however now been postponed and it is unclear if and when it will take place.
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In any case, the conference's purpose has never been to adopt a treaty, but to be a further step in the negotiation process that should eventually lead to the long-term goal of drafting and adopting a treaty. 
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This chapter explores the legal issues arising from the proposed WMD-free zone in the Middle East in the light of the existing NWFZ treaties. It first looks at the conditions for the entry into force and termination of the treaty and then analyses the obligations arising from NWFZ treaties for both regional and external states. Issues related to the navigational rights of external states are examined in Section 6, while Sections 7 and 8 highlight the weaknesses of the NWFZ treaties in relation to their verification and enforcement. Finally, the last Section examines the possible consequences of the postponement of the 2012 conference.
Entry into force and termination of the treaty
Different instruments are at the disposal of the regional states to establish a WMD-free zone.
All NWFZs in existence have been established by treaty, with the exception of Mongolia that unilaterally declared itself denuclearized in 1992. Unilateral declarations can give rise to international obligations if they are made publicly and with an intent to be bound:
19 however, they hardly seem to be the most suitable instrument for the de-weaponization of a whole region, in particular a conflictual one. In principle, a zone could also be denuclearized as a consequence of customary international law, should the relevant state practice and opinio juris exist, in a way similar to Switzerland's permanent neutrality. This is however not the case of the Middle East, where state practice and opinio juris suggest exactly the opposite.
As recommended in the above mentioned General Assembly Resolution 3472 (XXX) B, then, the conclusion of a treaty among the regional states remains the best option to establish a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, as well as elsewhere. important to include a specific provision in the treaty affirming that it continues its operation even in case of armed conflict.
Core obligations
By ratifying a NWFZ treaty, states first of all commit themselves not to possess or accept on their territory 'nuclear weapons' or 'nuclear explosive devices'. The broader notion of 'nuclear explosive device' is used in the Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk treaties and should be preferred to 'nuclear weapon', 37 as the latter might leave some ambiguity on whether nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes are admissible. 38 The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone' and in such a case 'a non-nuclear weapon State allied to a nuclear-weapon State can […] also be a party to a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty'. 46 In order to avoid assuming conflicting obligations, the denuclearized states should carefully verify that the NWFZ treaty is not in contrast with other agreements to which they are a party.
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Another problem is related to the distinction between stationing and other forms of presence of nuclear weapons within the zone. As in all NWFZ treaties the right of any ship and aircraft, including those carrying nuclear weapons, to visit ports and landing in airfields is reaffirmed, 48 it would be important to clarify when such visits become 'stationing': no limits of number or duration is provided in the existing NWFZ treaties.
The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons by the states parties only expressly appears in the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Bangkok and Semipalatinsk. 49 It could however be argued that such prohibition is unnecessary as it is implied in the prohibition of possession and control. To avoid ambiguity, however, it would be advisable that the Middle East WMD-free zone treaty expressly contains such important prohibition.
Other obligations
Apart from the two core prohibitions of possession/control and stationing, the NFWZ treaties The Pelindaba Treaty is also the only treaty that prohibits to take, assist or encourage any action aimed at an armed attack 'by conventional or other means' against nuclear 52 Art. 6 of the Rarotonga Treaty; Art. 3 of the Bangkok Treaty; Art. 5 of the Pelindaba Treaty; Art. 5 of the Semipalatinsk Treaty. 53 Roscini, above note 37, 263-264. 54 As acknowledged in the guidelines adopted by the Disarmament Commission in 1999, NWFZs are 'a useful complement to the international regime for the prohibition of any nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosion' (Report of the Disarmament Commission, above note 4, para. (2), '1. Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be made the object of attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. 2. The special protection against attack provided by paragraph 1 shall cease: (a) for a dam or a dyke only if it is used for other than its normal function and in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support; (b) for a nuclear electrical generating station only if it provides electric power in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support; (c) for other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations only if they are used in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support'. 62 In the Middle East WMD-free zone, the prohibition should also cover attacks against installations containing chemical or biological substances.
cause of peace to extend the prohibition of armed attack so as to protect all nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes'. 63 The prohibition of attacks on nuclear installations would also have another aspect of particular interest in the context of the Middle East if one recalls the recent case of the Stuxnet malware that damaged the centrifuges at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in Iran: 64 the question is whether a cyber attack would amount to an 'armed attack' in the sense of a provision like Article 11 of the Pelindaba Treaty.
The fact that the provision refers to attacks 'by conventional or other means' seems to allow a broad interpretation, at least with regard to cyber operations that produce consequences comparable to those of attacks conducted with kinetic weapons. 65 A further aspect of NWFZ treaties, which distinguishes them from other nonproliferation treaties, is that they also contain provisions aiming to protect the natural environment, such as the prohibition to dump radioactive substances at sea 66 , the obligation not to allow the disposal of radioactive waste of other states, 67 and the obligation to ratify the 1986 Vienna Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. 68 Furthermore, according to Article 6 of the Semipalatinsk Treaty, '[e]ach party undertakes to assist any efforts toward the environmental rehabilitation of territories contaminated as a result of past activities related to the development, production or storage of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in particular uranium tailings storage sites and nuclear test sites'. 69 The obligation is however a mere obligation of conduct, not an obligation to achieve a precise result (the environmental rehabilitation of contaminated territories) and is presumably triggered by the request for assistance of the state to which the contaminated territories belong.
Considering that terrorism has affected most, if not all, states in the Middle East and that the region has served as a hub for illicit nuclear trafficking, it would be important that the 
The obligations of external states
70 The Convention, opened for signature on 3 March 1980 and entered into force on 8 February 1987, requires each contracting party 'to take appropriate steps within the framework of its national law and consistent with international law to ensure as far as practicable that, during international nuclear transport, nuclear material within its territory, or on board a ship or aircraft under its jurisdiction insofar as such ship or aircraft is engaged in the transport to or from that State, is protected at the levels described in Annex 1' (Art. 3). The purpose, which is instrumental to Arts. I, II and III of the NPT, is to prevent fissile material, usable for the construction of arms from being illegally stolen. Of the potential parties to the Middle East WMD-free zone, only Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Somalia and Syria have not yet ratified the Physical Protection Convention. 71 The recommendations were prepared for the first time in 1972 by a panel of experts convened by the IAEA Director General and were revised in 1975 , 1977 , 1989 , 1993 , 1998 . See Fahmy and Lewis, above note 57, 46. Even though they are not binding, the implementation of the IAEA recommendations is required by the agreements that the Agency concludes with the states to which it provides assistance and by the bilateral cooperation agreements in the field of nuclear energy. 72 The text can be read at <http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/aptkoreanuc.pdf>. The legal status of the document is unclear. In December 1993, UN General Assembly Resolution 48/75 L, adopted by consensus, recommended 'the negotiation in the most appropriate international forum of a nondiscriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices'. The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference's Decision 2 indicated '[t]he immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a nondiscriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices' as a an important measure for the full implementation of Art. VI of the NPT (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), Annex, para. 4, <www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/NPT_CONF199501.pdf>).
The typical structure of a NWFZ treaty regime includes protocols attached to the main treaty.
One is addressed to the external states that are de jure or de facto internationally responsible for non-independent territories situated within the zone (if any). 73 By ratifying these protocols, such states commit themselves to respect at least some prohibitions of the NWFZ treaties with regard to the territory for which they are internationally responsible. The external states continue then to possess nuclear weapons even after the ratification of the protocol, but they cannot station or test them in their territories within the zone. This is not without problems. In some cases, as Guantánamo Bay, it might not be easy to establish what state is responsible de jure or de facto for the territory. 74 The question is whether the competence to denuclearize the territory rests on the United States, because of the lease of the territory from Cuba, or on Cuba itself, which has maintained sovereignty over the area. The former is probably correct, as the lease was exactly for the use of the territory for military purposes. Furthermore, since Cuba's sovereignty over Guantánamo Bay is reduced to a nudum jus, it would not be able to implement the denuclearization obligations contained in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. See Roscini, above note 37, 123-125. See <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/pelindaba_1/unitedkingdomofgreatbritainandnorthernireland/s ig/cairo>. 77 See <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/pelindaba_1/russianfederation/sig/cairo>. Problems have also arisen in the context of the Pelindaba Treaty with regard to the Canary Islands and Madeira, which Spain and Portugal refuse to see as 'African' dependencies (Roscini, above note 37, 141). 78 Ronzitti, above note 26, 28.
Occupying Power assume the relevant, and more limited, obligations by ratifying a protocol addressed to states that have the responsibility of non-independent territories within the zone? The latter solution would be politically unacceptable for the Palestinians, while the former would probably lead to the refusal of Israel (and perhaps also of the United States and the United Kingdom) to participate in the treaty. It should be recalled that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) enjoys some treaty-making power at least for matters related to the right of self-determination of the people it represents:
79 a more practical option might then be an ad hoc protocol signed by the PLO, with the caveat that the protocol does not affect the status of the territories.
Another protocol is addressed to the nuclear weapon states, which, by ratifying it, agree not to test any nuclear weapons within the zone. 80 These Protocols do not distinguish between atmospheric and underground nuclear tests and therefore complements the CTBT regime.
Finally, a protocol contains the negative security assurances provided by the NPT nuclear weapon states to the denuclearized states. These are so far the only legally binding nuclear assurances provided by the nuclear weapon states. 81 With the exception of China, however, the nuclear powers have issued declarations at the moment of signature and/or ratification by which they have reserved the right to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, in particular when a denuclearized state is in material breach of its denuclearization obligations or in the case of an attack on the nuclear weapon state, its dependent territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by a party to the NWFZ treaty in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon State. seek Senate advice and consent to ratification of the Rarotonga and Pelindaba Protocols. 83 As to the Bangkok and Semipalatinsk Protocols, Clinton declared that the US government is willing to continue consultations with the zonal states in order to eventually ratify the instruments.
The Protocol attached to the Bangkok Treaty has proved to be particularly controversial, as the obligation not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons applies anywhere 'within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone': this means that the nuclear weapon states would be prevented from using nuclear weapons against a state not party to the treaty but the territory of which is included in its geographical scope of application, 84 launching missiles with a nuclear warhead from ships, submarines or aircraft located within the zone (even to hit a target located outside it), and employing nuclear weapons against any vessel (even belonging to another nuclear weapon state) which is in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or on the continental shelf of the parties. This is one of the reasons why the nuclear powers, and the United States in particular, have so far refused to sign the Bangkok Protocol. This language should be avoided in the Middle East WMD-free zone treaty, so to secure the support of all nuclear weapon states.
Finally, as India and Pakistan are geographically very close to the Middle East and also de facto nuclear powers, they should also be invited to provide negative security assurances to the zonal states. 
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The navigational rights of external states
One of the most controversial features of the NWFZ treaties is their maritime boundaries.
Since the fulfilment of the requirements of Article 29 (1), which occurred in 2002, for instance, the zone of application of the Treaty of Tlatelolco has included portions of international waters off to the coast of Latin America, defined by geographical coordinates. 88 The South Pacific NWFZ also encompasses ocean areas, but the main provisions of the Rarotonga Treaty only apply to the waters under the sovereignty of the contracting parties and the airspace above them (the only exceptions are the prohibition for the parties to dump radioactive materials at sea and the prohibition for the nuclear powers to test nuclear explosive devices). 89 The
Bangkok Treaty explicitly includes within the Southeast Asia NWFZ the EEZ and the continental shelf of the parties: only the prohibition of dumping, however, seems to apply to those spaces, even though the treaty is ambiguous as far as the transit of nuclear ships is concerned. 90 The
Pelindaba Treaty, more cautiously, provides that the boundaries of the African NWFZ correspond with the outer border of the territorial sea of the parties.
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The fact that marine areas are included in the NWFZs was of concern to the nuclear powers as it could have affected the navigational rights of ships carrying nuclear weapons of external states, and, ultimately, nuclear deterrence policies. 92 The issue is of particular (Article 2 (2)). 93 Pursuant to this norm, if the law of the sea recognizes the usual rights of 88 Before that moment, the denuclearization concerned only the whole of the territories of the states for which the treaty is in force and which had issued the declaration of waiver provided for in Art. 29 (2). 96 Iran, Oman and UAE have proclaimed EEZs. It is however to be recalled that practice in relation to the MOX (plutonium-uranium mixed oxide) shipments from Europe to Japan suggests the possible future emergence of a more restrictive regime according to which the coastal states may prohibit vessels carrying hazardous substances to enter their EEZ. See <www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf39.html> for the facts and my comments in M. Roscini, 'La zone dénucléarisée du sud-est asiatique: problèmes de droit de la mer', 105 Revue générale de droit international public (2001), 628-633. visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships through its territorial sea or archipelagic waters and overflight of foreign aircraft above those waters in a manner not governed by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage or transit passage'. 97 This provision introduces a further exception to the general obligation of the states parties to a NWFZ treaty not to allow the possession or control of any nuclear explosive device in their territory by anyone. Consequently, not only do the NWFZ treaties not prejudice the normal navigational rights of ships and aircraft under the law of the sea, including those carrying nuclear weapons, but they do not even require the parties to prevent other forms of presence (providing they do not amount to stationing). This clause is unnecessary and represents a serious loophole in the denuclearization regime and should therefore not be included in the Middle East WMD-free zone treaty.
One of the Middle Eastern states to be included in the WMD-free zone, Iran, borders the Caspian Sea. The Caspian is not actually a 'sea' but rather an international lake not governed by the law of the sea. 98 No agreement among the littoral states has been reached on the delimitation of its waters yet. Its inclusion in the Middle East WMD-free zone might therefore raise issues that have already arisen in connection with the Central Asian NWFZ. 99 The
Semipalatinsk Treaty solved the problem by adding a clause providing that '[n]othing in this
Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights of any Central Asian States in any dispute concerning the ownership of or sovereignty over lands or waters that may or may not be included within this zone'. A similar provision should be included in the Middle East WMD-free zone treaty as well.
Verification
The above mentioned General Assembly Resolution 3472 (XXX) B requires that NWFZs provide for an 'international system of verification and control'. In the NWFZ treaties, these tasks are usually performed by two parallel mechanisms, one entrusted to the IAEA and the other to regional bodies. The regional organs or organizations could be set up by the NWFZ treaty itself The conference for a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, called for by the NPT 2010 Review
Conference and which was supposed to take place in December 2012, has now been postponed sine die. 108 Although it was never supposed to be a drafting conference, it would have been an important step in the negotiation and eventual adoption of a treaty establishing such zone. As the conference has not been convened, what are the possible scenarios?
The best case scenario, supported by the co-sponsors of the Middle East Resolution and by the facilitator, 109 is that the conference will take place at the earliest opportunity before the 2015 NPT Review Conference. Certain regional states have however manifested their strong disappointment for the aborted 2012 conference. Indeed, the Middle Eastern states (with the exception of Israel) attach great importance to the WMD-free zone project, which was part of the great bargain for the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. Arab League members have
